The Actual Nature of the Service Determines Whether the Supplier Is an Intermediary
An Indian company may provide marketing, recruitment support, IT or administrative services to an overseas customer. While performing these activities, it may deal with third parties who benefit from the services. However, such dealings do not automatically make the Indian company an intermediary. The essential question is whether it provides the contracted services on its own account or merely arranges or facilitates a separate supply between other persons.
This distinction arose in the case of Navitas Eduservices Private Limited, an Indian subsidiary of Navitas Pty Limited, Australia. Under a Master Services Agreement dated 07.12.2016, Navitas India provided marketing, promotional, business support and IT-enabled services to its Australian parent. Its activities included supporting student recruitment advisers, promoting overseas universities, assisting with admission-related documentation, developing websites and managing digital marketing activities. Navitas India received payment from its Australian parent in Australian dollars on a cost-plus-16% basis. The Department treated these activities as intermediary services and rejected its refund claims relating to exports of services.

The dispute came before the GST Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in Navitas Eduservices Private Limited v. Commissioner of CGST, South Delhi, 2026-VIL-209-GSTAT-DEL-PB; 2026-TIOL-119-GSTAT-DEL-PB, decided on 14.10.2026. The Bench, comprising Hon'ble Justice (Retd.) Dr. Sanjaya Kumar Mishra, President, and Hon'ble Shri Anil Kumar Gupta, Member (Technical), decided five taxpayer appeals and one departmental appeal through a common order. Two distinct legal issues arose: whether Navitas India's services qualified as exports rather than intermediary services, and whether the First Appellate Authority could remand a matter to the original authority for reconsideration. The taxpayer succeeded on the first issue, while the Department succeeded on the second.
The Contractual Relationship Determines the Actual Role of the Service Provider
Navitas Eduservices Private Limited, formerly known as Learning Information Systems (India) Private Limited, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Navitas Pty Limited, Australia, which operated an international education business through partner universities and recruitment advisers. Under a Master Services Agreement dated 07.12.2016, Navitas India provided marketing, promotional, business-support and IT-enabled services to its Australian parent.
These services included developing marketing strategies, supporting recruitment advisers, assisting with student applications and document verification, developing websites, managing digital marketing and maintaining the Study Link portal. Navitas India received payment in Australian dollars on a cost-plus-16% basis. The agreement treated the Indian company as an independent contractor and restricted its authority to undertake obligations on behalf of the Australian company.
Navitas Australia had separate agreements with recruitment advisers, who received commissions based on successful student enrolments. Navitas India was not a party to those agreements. Therefore, the role of the recruitment advisers could not automatically be attributed to Navitas India. The contractual obligations, services performed and payment arrangements had to be examined separately to determine whether Navitas India provided services on its own account or acted as an intermediary.
This distinction had a direct GST consequence. Navitas India treated its services as exports under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act, 2017, and claimed refunds of unutilised input tax credit under Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017, read with Section 16 of the IGST Act. However, the Department classified the services as intermediary services under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act. For the relevant period, Section 13(8)(b) treated the location of the intermediary supplier as the place of supply. Consequently, the Department considered the place of supply to be in India, denied export treatment and rejected the refund claims. Thus, the central dispute was whether Navitas India supplied independent services to its Australian parent or merely facilitated supplies between other persons.
Counting Three Parties Does Not Complete the Intermediary Test
The Department relied on the involvement of Navitas Australia, universities, advisers and students. It argued that Navitas India helped facilitate the supply of education and therefore acted as an intermediary. However, merely identifying several participants in a commercial network does not establish the legal relationship required by Section 2(13) of the IGST Act, 2017.
The intermediary framework involves a principal supply between other persons and a separate service that arranges or facilitates that supply. The supplier’s actual role is therefore central. A person performing its own contracted work is not necessarily providing a separate facilitation service merely because that work contributes to another transaction. Commercial assistance and statutory intermediation are not interchangeable expressions.
The Tribunal applied the own-account exclusion and examined whether Navitas India acted as a broker, agent, or similar facilitator. It concluded that the company supplied substantive services as an independent subcontractor. The relevant inquiry was not simply how many people benefited from the business, but what Navitas India undertook to supply.
Subcontracting Remains Different From Merely Arranging a Supply
CBIC Circular No.159/15/2021-GST dated 20.09.2021 explains that a subcontractor actually supplying the principal service, wholly or partly, is not an intermediary merely because another business has outsourced the work to it. The subcontractor supplies its own service to the principal supplier; it does not merely arrange a supply between that principal and another person. The clarification also recognises that interaction with the ultimate customer need not change this position.
A simple illustration helps. A foreign company may engage an Indian company to develop software, prepare marketing material or process applications. The Indian company may need information from the foreign company’s customers to complete that work. Such contact does not, by itself, turn performance of the contracted service into brokerage. By contrast, a person whose task is merely to bring two other parties together for a separate supply presents a different arrangement.
Navitas India’s case required the same distinction. The Department’s focus on the broader education business could not replace examination of the services subcontracted to the Indian company. The relevant service was the work Navitas India actually undertook, not simply the ultimate educational programme supported by that work.
The Payment Method Supports the Analysis but Does Not Decide It Alone
The difference between Navitas India’s cost-plus remuneration and the advisers’ enrolment-linked commission supported the distinction between their roles. The Indian company was paid for its contracted operations, while the advisers operated under separate arrangements with Navitas Australia. Reading these relationships together helped identify the service each participant supplied.
Nevertheless, cost-plus remuneration does not automatically exempt an intermediary from classification. Equally, describing consideration as commission does not necessarily establish an intermediary relationship. A payment label cannot replace examination of the underlying obligations and actual conduct. The contractual scope, responsibility for performance, authority to represent others and nature of the supply remain important.
The Tribunal’s conclusion therefore rested on the arrangement as a whole. Neither foreign-currency payment nor cost-plus remuneration, considered alone, would answer every export question. Their significance arose from their connection with the independent supply established by the agreements and supporting records.
Outsourced Work Does Not Lose Its Independent Character Because It Serves Another Customer
In Genpact India Private Limited v. Union of India, 2022-VIL-751-P&H, the Punjab and Haryana High Court examined outsourced business-process services supplied under a subcontracting arrangement. The Indian company performed substantive work using its own resources, even where the deliverables reached the overseas principal’s customers. The absence of a separate contract with those customers and the actual performance of the services were material. The arrangement did not become intermediary activity merely because the work supported the principal’s customer relationships.
Similarly, Columbia Sportswear India Sourcing Private Limited v. Union of India, 2025-VIL-512-KAR concerned sourcing and business-support activities for an overseas entity. The Karnataka High Court considered the independent-contractor relationship, the absence of authority to bind the foreign recipient and the substantive services performed. Its reasoning distinguished actual support services from merely obtaining or arranging another person’s supply.
The Tribunal also relied on Commissioner, Central Excise, CGST-Delhi South Commissionerate v. Blackberry India (P) Ltd [SLP (C) No. 25992 of 2024, dated 4-11-2024]- 2024-VIL-69-SC-ST. , M/s. DowChemical International Pvt, Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of State Tax, Mazgaon, Mumbai, (2026) 1 GSTAT E- Journal15 (Principal Bench) - 2026-VIL-26-GSTAT-DEL. These authorities helped interpret the own-account exclusion. Their relevance lay in the nature of the service and contractual role, not in creating a blanket rule that every outsourced activity must receive identical treatment.
Incidental Assistance to Students Does Not Make Them the Contractual Recipient
The education-sector comparison was particularly important. In Fateh Education Consulting Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3200 , the Delhi High Court examined consultancy, marketing and recruitment support supplied to foreign universities. Consideration came from those universities; students were not charged, and the supplier lacked authority to bind the universities or guarantee admission. Incidental assistance to Indian students did not, by itself, make the services intermediary services.
The practical distinction is between the person receiving the contracted service and a person who benefits from its performance. A student may benefit from information, document checking or application assistance. That benefit does not automatically establish that the student is the recipient of the particular service contracted and paid for by an overseas entity.
Navitas India’s arrangement was not identical to every education consultancy contract, but the reasoning helped identify the correct questions. Who engaged the supplier, who was liable to pay, what work was promised and whether the supplier merely arranged another supply mattered more than the location of an incidental beneficiary. The Tribunal accordingly followed the applicable High Court reasoning rather than the contrary advance rulings cited by the Department.
An Explained Name Change Is Different From an Unidentified Service Recipient
The refund rejection also referred to differences between the names appearing in the agreements and invoices. The agreement used the earlier name, Learning Information Systems (India) Private Limited, while later documents used the Navitas name. The original order also referred to the descriptions used for the Australian entity.
The Tribunal considered the explained corporate history and noted that the Indian company’s reconstitution and changed name were not seriously disputed. The naming objection did not establish a substantive defect sufficient to defeat the claims. The Tribunal must compare a document bearing an earlier company name with the corporate records, not automatically treat it as evidence of a different transaction.
This finding should not be enlarged into permission to disregard identity discrepancies. Businesses should maintain the records connecting earlier and current names, agreements, invoices and foreign remittances. An explained change and an unresolved uncertainty about the actual supplier or recipient are different situations.
Export Eligibility Requires More Than an Overseas Payment
Navitas India submitted that the conditions under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act, 2017 were satisfied: the supplier was in India, the recipient was outside India, the place of supply was outside India, consideration was received in convertible foreign exchange, and the entities were not merely establishments of a distinct person. The intermediary classification was central because it affected the place-of-supply analysis for the disputed periods.
The taxpayer relied on its agreements, export invoices, foreign inward remittance certificates and transfer-pricing records. It also opposed the Department’s physical-presence and unjust-enrichment objections. The Tribunal ultimately accepted the export classification on the arrangement before it. That conclusion should not be restated as a rule that payment by any foreign customer automatically establishes export eligibility.
The refund periods concerned 2018 to 2023. Application to other periods requires examination of the statutory provisions governing those periods and any subsequent amendments. The judgment’s enduring classification principle is the distinction between supplying a service on one’s own account and arranging someone else’s supply.
Five Refunds Were Allowed, but the Departmental Matter Remained Open
The taxpayer’s five appeals succeeded, and the adverse appellate orders were set aside. The Tribunal directed refunds of unutilised ITC totalling Rs.1,41,09,366, along with interest from the dates specified for each appeal in paragraph 37. The individual amounts and dates are relevant to the calculation but are not reproduced to explain the legal principle.
Paragraph 37 mentions interest at 6% and 9% without clearly explaining which rate applies to which period or appeal. The two rates should not be added together, nor should 9% be assumed to apply throughout. The paragraph also does not fix a separate deadline for payment of these refunds.
The Department’s appeal had a different outcome. Its objection to the First Appellate Authority’s remand was accepted, and the matter was returned to the First Appellate Authority for a decision on the merits. The refund total therefore relates only to the five taxpayer appeals; it does not include a refund finally allowed in the separate departmental matter.
Annulment Cannot Be Used to Achieve a Remand Prohibited by Law
The Department’s appeal challenged an order in which the First Appellate Authority annulled the original decision and directed the adjudicating officer to reconsider the matter. Section 107(11) of the CGST Act, 2017 permits confirmation, modification or annulment, but expressly prevents the First Appellate Authority from referring the case back to the officer who passed the original order.
The distinction is substantive, not merely terminological. An order does not cease to be a remand merely because it first declares the original order annulled. If its operative direction sends the matter back for reconsideration, it produces the result prohibited by the provision. The power to annul cannot be used as an indirect means to exercise the power to remand.
The Department therefore succeeded on this objection. That success did not establish that its intermediary classification was correct. It established that the First Appellate Authority had used an impermissible procedure. The service-classification reasoning and the limits on appellate power remained separate questions.
The Power to Remand Depends on the Governing Statute
Different appellate authorities do not necessarily have the same powers. Section 107(11) of the CGST Act, 2017 prevents the First Appellate Authority from sending a case back to the original adjudicating officer. However, Section 113(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 expressly allows the GSTAT to remand a matter to the Appellate Authority, Revisional Authority or original adjudicating authority. Therefore, there was no contradiction in rejecting the First Appellate Authority’s remand while directing a remand through the Tribunal’s own order. Each authority had to act within the powers granted to it.
In the Department’s appeal, the matter was returned to the First Appellate Authority, not to the original adjudicating officer. That authority had to hear both sides and decide the case on merits, consistently with the principles explained in the Tribunal’s common order. The Tribunal preferred disposal within six weeks of taking cognisance of its order. This was a preferred timeframe for deciding the remanded matter, not a deadline for paying the refunds directed in the other five appeals.
The different outcomes must also remain clear. The taxpayer’s five appeals resulted in refund directions, while the Department’s separate appeal resulted in fresh examination by the First Appellate Authority. The Department’s success in setting aside an unlawful remand did not amount to acceptance of its argument that the services were intermediary services. Equally, the refund directions in the five taxpayer appeals did not automatically dispose of the separate departmental matter. A common order must be read according to the relief granted in each appeal.
The Actual Nature of the Service Must Determine Its GST Treatment
The decision reinforces that the GST treatment of a service must be determined by the actual role performed by the supplier. The agreement, contractual obligations, services rendered, invoices and payment arrangements must be examined together. Activities such as preparing marketing strategies, developing websites, managing digital campaigns and maintaining an online application portal may constitute independent services supplied to an overseas customer. Their connection with the customer's wider business does not automatically make the Indian supplier an intermediary.
Similarly, communicating with prospective students, supporting recruitment advisers, verifying application documents and providing admission-related assistance do not, by themselves, establish intermediary status. The decisive question is whether the Indian company provides these services on its own account or arranges or facilitates a separate supply between other persons. The fact that students, universities or recruitment advisers benefit from its activities is not sufficient to establish that it acts as an intermediary.
In the present case, the Tribunal concluded that Navitas India was providing services on its own account to its Australian parent and was not acting as an intermediary. Accordingly, it accepted the taxpayer's claim that the services qualified for export treatment rather than being treated as intermediary services. On the separate procedural issue, the Tribunal accepted the Department's contention that the First Appellate Authority lacked the statutory power to remand the matter to the original authority. Thus, the taxpayer succeeded on the substantive issue of service classification, while the Department succeeded on the question of appellate powers.
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