A Valid Demand Begins With a Living Legal Person
Tax administration often begins with a notice. That notice may appear to be a routine document, but in law it serves a very serious function. It informs the person concerned that the State proposes to demand tax, interest, or a penalty. It gives that person an opportunity to respond to the allegation. It also confers jurisdiction on the authority to proceed further. If the notice itself is issued to a person who does not exist in law, the entire proceeding rests on a broken foundation.
This is the central lesson emerging from Kanakia Spaces Realty Private Limited v. Union of India and Others, 2026 (6) TMI 1351 (Bombay High Court), Writ Petition No. 2586 of 2026, decided on 24.06.2026. The case arose under GST law, but the principle involved is much broader. A company that has ceased to exist after amalgamation cannot be treated as a living taxable person merely because the tax department seeks to recover an alleged past liability. The law may permit recovery from the correct successor if the statutory conditions are satisfied. But it does not permit the authority to issue a fresh show cause notice in the name of a dissolved company.

The judgment is important because it draws a careful line between liability and jurisdiction. Liability may sometimes survive an amalgamation. Jurisdiction, however, must be asserted against the correct person. A demand cannot be saved by saying that some tax may have been payable if the very notice initiating the demand was addressed to an entity that had already disappeared from the legal world.
The Merger Was Known, but the Notice Still Chased the Past
The facts were direct and largely undisputed. Kanakia Supremo Construction Private Limited (KSCPL) was amalgamated with Kanakia Spaces Realty Private Limited. The scheme of amalgamation was approved by an order dated 29.11.2016. The appointed date of the merger was 01.04.2015. After the amalgamation, KSCPL stood dissolved, and its name was struck off the records of the Registrar of Companies.
This was not a case where the department could claim that the amalgamation was concealed or that it learnt of it only later. KSCPL had informed the Service Tax Department of the amalgamation by letter dated 22.02.2017. The petitioner again informed the department on 18.07.2019 that KSCPL had already amalgamated and ceased to exist. The GST registration of KSCPL was also cancelled on 17.02.2020 after determining nil liability.
Despite these facts, FORM GST DRC-01A dated 21.05.2025 and a show cause notice dated 25.06.2025 were issued in the name of KSCPL under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017. The notice proposed a GST demand of Rs.44,78,61,113, along with interest and penalty. The petitioner objected that the proceedings were void because KSCPL no longer existed. The adjudicating authority, however, passed an Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2025, confirming a GST demand of Rs.42,65,34,393, interest under Section 50, and penalty under Section 74, while dropping the demand of Rs.2,13,26,720 towards land value.
The matter therefore, came before the Bombay High Court with a narrow yet powerful question. Can an order demanding tax, interest and penalty survive when the show cause notice itself was issued to an amalgamating company that had already ceased to exist?
Jurisdiction Is Substance, Not a Mere Name on the Portal
The High Court treated the defect as jurisdictional rather than clerical. This distinction is vital. A clerical error may sometimes be corrected. An incorrect address, incorrect spelling, or minor misdescription may not always destroy the proceeding if the intended person is clear and the law permits correction. But a notice to a non-existent legal person is different. It is not a notice to the wrong branch or wrong office. It is a notice to nobody in the eyes of the law.
After amalgamation, the transferor company loses its independent legal existence. It cannot sue. It cannot be sued. It cannot hold property in its own name. It cannot receive a statutory notice as a living taxable person. Once the company has dissolved pursuant to an approved scheme, it becomes legally impossible to initiate fresh proceedings against it in its own name.
The Court therefore focused on the foundation of the proceeding. The issue was not whether the department had a tax claim in substance. The issue was whether the department's legal process was capable of supporting such a claim. The answer was in the negative. A jurisdictional notice must be issued to a person who exists in law. Since KSCPL had ceased to exist, the notice issued to it could not confer jurisdiction on the authority.
Successor Participation Cannot Cure a Dead Notice
The Bombay High Court relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., [2019] 416 ITR 613 = 2019 (7) TMI 1449 (SC). Although that case arose under the income tax law, the underlying principle is not confined to income tax. It is a basic principle of legal personality and jurisdiction.
In Maruti Suzuki, assessment proceedings were initiated against an amalgamating company that had ceased to exist after the amalgamation. The revenue authorities were aware of the amalgamation. The Supreme Court held that such proceedings were void ab initio. The expression void ab initio means void from the very beginning. The defect did not arise at a later stage. It existed at the moment the proceeding was initiated.
The Supreme Court also rejected the idea that participation by the successor could cure the defect. This is a very important part of the principle. If jurisdiction is absent at the beginning, later participation cannot create it. A successor company may respond to protect itself. It may file replies, attend hearings, or point out the defect. But such participation does not mean that the original notice becomes valid. A party cannot, by defending itself, give legal life to an invalid proceeding.
That principle applied squarely to the Kanakia case. The petitioner had pointed out that KSCPL no longer existed. The department had already been informed of the amalgamation. In these circumstances, the notice to KSCPL could not be treated as a harmless mistake. It was a jurisdictional failure.
Departmental Knowledge Makes the Defect Fatal
The Court also followed Reliance Industries Limited v. P.L. Roongta, [2025] 479 ITR 770 = 2025 (2) TMI 612 (Bombay High Court). This decision reinforced the same principle in the context of proceedings initiated against a non-existent amalgamating company after the authority had knowledge of the amalgamation.
Reliance Industries is significant because it emphasises institutional knowledge and procedural discipline. When the department has been informed that a company has merged and ceased to exist, it must update its legal approach. It cannot continue proceedings in the old name and later argue that the successor understood the matter. The question is not merely whether the successor knew about the demand. The question is whether the State followed the correct legal route for creating and enforcing that demand.
This principle carries special weight in GST. The GST system is highly registration-driven and portal-driven. Registrations, cancellations, notices and orders are all part of a structured electronic record. When a registration has been cancelled and the authority is aware of the amalgamation, the department's burden to address the proceeding against the correct legal person becomes even more serious. Procedural efficiency cannot override jurisdictional correctness.
Section 87 Preserves Liability, Not the Legal Life of a Dissolved Company
The department relied on Section 87 of the CGST Act. This provision addresses liability in cases of amalgamation or merger of companies. It applies when two or more companies are amalgamated or merged by an order of a court or tribunal, or otherwise, and the order takes effect from a date earlier than the date of the order. During the intervening period, supplies made between the companies are to be included in the respective companies' turnover, and the companies are treated as distinct persons up to the date of the order.
The department's argument was that Section 87 permitted the recovery of GST dues owed by the transferor entity even after a merger. The High Court approached the provision with care. It did not say that Section 87 is meaningless. It did not say that liabilities in an amalgamation cannot be recovered. It only held that Section 87 cannot be used to justify a notice issued to a non-existent company after amalgamation.
This is a balanced interpretation. Section 87 may help determine who is liable and for which period. It may prevent tax consequences from disappearing merely because a merger order has a retrospective effect. But it does not revive the dissolved company. It does not create a legal fiction that the transferor company continues to exist forever for the purpose of receiving notices. A provision dealing with liability cannot be stretched to authorise proceedings against a dead entity.
This part of the judgment is particularly useful for officers and professionals. It reminds us that every statutory provision has a field of operation. Section 87 may govern liability in certain amalgamation situations. Section 74 may govern demands involving fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression. Section 50 may govern interest. But none of these provisions removes the basic requirement that proceedings must be initiated against a person who exists under the law.
The Statutory Fiction Stops at the Intervening Period
The Court also relied on Vodafone Idea Ltd. (formerly known as Vodafone Mobile Services Ltd.) v. Union of India and Others, 2026 (5) TMI 162 (Bombay High Court). In that case, the Bombay High Court examined the scope of Section 87 and held that it applies to the intervening period from the effective date of amalgamation till the date of the order. It does not authorise the department to issue a show cause notice to a non-existent entity after a merger or amalgamation.
The distinction is simple but important. In amalgamation cases, the appointed date may be earlier than the date on which the court or tribunal approves the scheme. During that intervening period, business may have been carried on, supplies may have been made, and tax consequences may have arisen. Section 87 ensures that such transactions are not lost in a legal vacuum. But once the order is made and the transferor company is dissolved, the statute does not permit a fresh proceeding to be addressed to the dissolved company as though nothing has changed.
By following Vodafone Idea, the Kanakia judgment gives Section 87 a practical and disciplined meaning. It protects revenue where the statute authorises it, but it also protects legal certainty where the statute does not authorise a proceeding against a non-existent entity.
When the Notice Falls, the Demand Order Cannot Stand
Once the show cause notice was held to be without jurisdiction, the fate of the Order-in-Original was clear. The order could not survive because it rested entirely on an invalid notice. In tax law, an adjudication order is not an independent entity. It derives its authority from the notice initiating the proceeding. If that notice is void, the order passed on it cannot be saved by discussing the merits of the demand.
The High Court therefore set aside the Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2025. This did not mean that the Court examined and rejected the tax demand on the merits. It did not decide whether the amount was payable. It did not examine every factual aspect of the demand. It only held that the particular proceeding before it could not be sustained because it had been initiated against a non-existent amalgamating company.
This approach is fair to both sides. It protects the taxpayer from being subjected to an order founded on an invalid notice. It also protects the revenue by leaving the merits open. The department was given liberty to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with the law, if otherwise permissible. The words “ if otherwise permissible” are important. They mean that any fresh proceeding must satisfy all statutory requirements, including limitation, jurisdiction, the correct person, the correct provision and proper procedure.
Corporate Restructuring Must Travel Into Tax Records
The practical message of the judgment is clear. Corporate restructuring is not merely a company law event. It has direct and indirect tax, accounting, contractual and regulatory consequences. Once a company amalgamates, every department dealing with that company must align its records with the new legal reality. Old names may persist in files, correspondence or internal databases, but tax action must be taken against the correct legal person.
For taxpayers, the judgment also offers a practical reminder. Communication of amalgamation should be clear, timely and documented. Copies of merger orders, appointed dates, effective dates, registration cancellations and departmental acknowledgments should be carefully preserved. In Kanakia, the petitioner could point to letters dated 22.02.2017 and 18.07.2019, and to the cancellation of GST registration on 17.02.2020. These facts strengthened the jurisdictional objection.
For tax officers, the judgment suggests a simple discipline. Before issuing a notice in the old corporate name, especially in large legacy matters, the status of the assessee should be verified. If amalgamation has taken place, the notice should be issued against the correct successor or the person liable under the relevant statutory provision. This simple discipline can prevent great demands from failing on jurisdictional grounds.
The Real Message: Recovery Must Travel Through Lawful Notice
Kanakia Spaces does not confer tax immunity merely because an amalgamation has taken place. It only insists that recovery must begin against the correct legal person. A valid demand may still be pursued where law permits, but the foundation must be a valid notice addressed to an existing entity. In GST proceedings, especially where corporate restructuring has occurred, verification of legal identity is not a formality. It is the first condition of jurisdiction