The judgment of the court was delivered by
HEGDE J.--This appeal by special leave arises from the
decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a reference under section 66(1)
of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act"). The question referred for the opinion of the High Court was:
"Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the income from the
property transferred to the assessee's wife for a consideration of Rs. 1 lakh
could be assessed in the hands of the assessee under section 16(3) of the Act
?"
The facts of the case, as set out in the statement of the
case. submitted by the Tribunal, are as follows:
The assessee, a Muslim, claimed in his assessment
proceedings for the assessment year 1961-62 that a particular item of income is
not his income but that of his wife. According to him he had transferred for
consideration the property from out of which the income in question arose to his
wife for a consideration of Rs. 1 lakh. His case was that at the time of his
marriage with the transferee, in 1930, a meher of Rs. 10,000 had been fixed.
But, in 1960, he enhanced the meher to rupees one lakh and in February or March
of that year he orally transferred the property in question to his wife to
discharge his meher. The Income-tax Officer did not accept the claim of the
assessee. He came to the conclusion that there is no satisfactory evidence to
show that the transfer in question is a genuine one. In his view the transaction
was a gift and not a transfer for consideration. The conclusion reached by the
Income-tax Officer was affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner. But, on a further appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, the
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the transfer was genuine as well as valid.
In its view it was open to the assessee to increase the meher fixed at the time
of marriage, on a subsequent date, and the evidence on record established the
enhancement pleaded by the assessee as well as the transfer put forward. It also
came to the conclusion that, ever since the transfer, the wife of the assessee
was in possession of the property transferred in her name. Hence, the income of
that property cannot be considered as the income of the assessee.
Aggrieved by that decision, the department sought to have
the following questions referred to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under
section 66(1) of the Act:
"(1) Whether, having regard to the evidence on
record, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the transfer of
property under dispute was not a gift ?
(2) Whether there was any material before the Appellate
Tribunal to support its finding that the assessee had in fact increased the
dower debt from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 1,00,000 ?
(3) Without prejudice to the questions Nos. 1. and 2
above, whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the property
transferred to the wife in consideration of dower debt did not attract, the
provisions of section 16(3)(a)(iii) ?"
The Tribunal opined that the only question of law that
arose for reference is the one mentioned by us earlier. In fact the Tribunal's
question proceeds on the basis that there was in fact a transfer as alleged by
the assessee and that transfer is a valid one. The question on which the
Tribunal sought the opinion of the High Court was whether the income of the
property so transferred could be assessed to tax under section 16(3) of the Act:
The question framed by the Tribunal appears to us to be self-contradictory. If
its findings are correct on fact as well as on law, there can be hardly any
doubt that the income of the property in question cannot come within the scope
of section 16(3)(iii).
The department does not appear to have made any attempt
before the High Court for calling for a supplementary statement of the case.
Unfortunately, the High Court instead of answering the question referred to it,
reframed the questions. While doing so, it observed: "In the application
made under section 66(1) of the Act, the department desired three questions to
be referred to this court. However, as already indicated, the Tribunal referred
only one question for the opinion of this court. That question, as formulated by
the Tribunal, does not pointedly bring out the real issue in controversy but we
think it is sufficiently wide to include within its ambit the following two
questions:
(i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
there could be, in law, an oral transfer of the property in lieu of rupees one
lakh due as dower debt ?
(ii) If so, whether the income from the property is liable
to be included in the assessable income under section 16(3) of the Act ?"
In our opinion the High Court had no jurisdiction to raise
new questions of law. The questions raised by it do not flow from the question
referred to it for its opinion. The High Court's power under the Act is only to
give its opinion on the questions of law referred to it by the Tribunal. It
cannot take into consideration questions of law which have not been referred to
it for its opinion. If the High Court thought that the question referred to it
did not bring out the real point in issue it was open to it to call for a fresh
statement of the case and direct the Tribunal to submit for its opinion the real
question arising for decision. The High Court did not do so. On the other hand
the High Court dealt with the reference as if it was dealing with an appeal
before it. It failed to realise the limits of its jurisdiction in references
under section 66(1).
It was urged by Mr. Manchanda, the learned counsel for the
department, that on the face of it, the transfer pleaded by the assessee is an
invalid one and the story put forward by him is unbelievable. We cannot go into
those questions in this appeal because this court is subject to the same
limitations, while hearing appeals against the orders of the High Courts in
references under section 66(1), as the High Courts are. Our advisory
jurisdiction is no more extensive than that of the High Courts.
For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this appeal and
set aside the order of the High Court. Now, the case will go back to the High
Court for considering the question referred to it, for disposal, according to
law. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.