The judgment of the court was delivered by
S. P. BHARUCHA J.-This is an appeal on a certificate
granted by the High Court of Kerala ( [1982] 136 ITR 733). The judgment under
appeal was delivered on a reference under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act,
1961. It answered in the negative, that is, against the appellant (assessee) and
in favour of the Revenue (respondent), the following question ( (1982) 136 ITR
734) :
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of
the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that the
Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction to levy the penalty and that he should
have referred the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for imposition
of penalty ?"
The reference pertained to the assessment year 1968-69,
the relevant accounting period having ended on March 31, 1968.
The assessee filed his return on April 16, 1970. With
effect from April 1, 1971, sub-section (2) of section 274 of the Income-tax Act,
1961, was amended. Prior to the said amendment where, in a case falling under
clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271, the minimum penalty imposable
exceeded the sum of Rs. 1,000, the Income-tax Officer was obliged to refer the
case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. By reason of the said amendment,
the Income-tax Officer was obliged to refer to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner such cases falling under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section
271, where the amount of income, as determined by the Income-tax Officer on
assessment, in respect of which particulars had been concealed or inaccurate
particulars had been furnished exceeded the sum of Rs. 25,000. On March 27,
1972, the Income-tax Officer made the orders of assessment and initiated penalty
proceedings against the assessee on the basis of a finding recorded in the
assessment order that there had been concealment of income in respect of an
amount which did not exceed Rs. 25,000. After considering the assessee's
objections, the Income-tax Officer, by order dated March 26, 1974, imposed a
penalty of Rs. 10,000.
The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner who set aside the penalty order on the ground that the Income-tax
Officer did not have the jurisdiction to levy the penalty. The Revenue carried
the matter to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which confirmed the order of the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It held that the law governing the imposition
of penalty for concealment of income was the law that was in force on the date
on which the return in which the concealment had been made was filed and that
the said amendment had no application to the case because it had not been made
expressly retrospective.
Arising out of the order of the Tribunal, the question
quoted above was referred to the High Court. The High Court noted that the
question to be considered was whether the proceedings for imposition of penalty
taken in the case were governed by the provisions of section 274(2) as they
stood prior to the said amendment or whether it was the sub-section as amended
that would apply. It concluded that the competence or jurisdiction of the
authority to initiate the penalty proceedings could be governed only by the law
which was in force on the date of initiation of such proceedings. A combined
reading of section 271(1)(c)(iii) and section 274(2) provided a clear indication
that, under the provisions of section 274(2) as they stood prior to the
amendment of 1970, the competence of the Income-tax Officer to exercise the
power of imposition of penalty against an assessee under section 271(1)(c) was
to depend upon the findings arrived at by him in the assessment proceedings as
to the factum of concealment and the amount of income in respect of which such
concealment had taken place. It was only on arriving at/such a finding that the
question of initiation of penalty proceedings could arise. In this connection,
the High Court referred to the judgment of this court in Jain Brothers v. Union
of India [1970] 77 ITR 107. Accordingly, the Tribunal was held to be in error
and the question referred to the High Court was answered in the negative, that
is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
Section 271(1)(c) confers upon the assessing authority the
power to direct an assessee to pay a penalty where he is satisfied that the
assessee has concealed the particulars of his income or has furnished inaccurate
particulars of his income. Section 274(2), before it was amended by the Taxation
Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, with effect from April 1, 1971, read thus:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii)
of sub-section (1) of section 271, if in a case falling under clause (c) of that
sub-section, the minimum penalty imposable exceeds a sum of rupees one thousand,
the Income-tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under
this Chapter for the imposition of penalty."
After the said amendment, it read thus :
"Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii)
of sub-section (1) of section 271, if in a case falling under clause (c) of that
sub-section, the amount of income (as determined by the Income-tax Officer on
assessment) in respect of which the particulars have been concealed or
inaccurate particulars have been furnished exceeds a sum of twenty-five thousand
rupees, the Income-tax Officer shall refer the case to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner who shall, for the purpose, have all the powers conferred under
this Chapter for the imposition of penalty."
Learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the
offence of concealment had been committed when the return had been filed ; that,
therefore, the unamended provisions of section 274(2) applied and the Income-tax
Officer had no authority to impose the penalty. He relied upon the judgment of
this court in CIT v. Onkar Saran and Sons [1992] 195 ITR 1. Emphasis was laid
upon the statement in the judgment that, after the decision of this court in
Brij Mohan v. CIT [1979] 120 ITR 1, there could be no doubt that the law
applicable to penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(a) or (c) was the law
that was in force on the date on which the offending return had been filed.
The issue in the cases of Onkar Saran [1992] 195 ITR 1
(SC) and Brij Mohan [1979] 120 ITR 1 (SC), related to the quantum of penalty
that could be demanded, and it was in that context that the statement that was
emphasised was made. In Brij Mohan's case [1979] 120 ITR 1 (SC), it was
expressly stated that penalty was imposed on account of the commission of a
wrongful act and " it is the law operating on the date on which the
wrongful act is committed which determines the penalty".
Learned counsel for the Revenue drew our attention, first
to this court's judgment in Jain Brothers' case [1970] 77 ITR 107. It was there
held, inter alia, that it was the satisfaction of the income-tax authorities
that a default had been committed by the assessee which attracted the provisions
relating to penalty. Whatever the stage at which the satisfaction was reached,
the order imposing the penalty had to be made only after the completion of the
assessment. The crucial date, therefore, for purposes of penalty, was the date
of such completion. In D. M. Manasvi v. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 557 (SC), this was
reiterated. Counsel for the Revenue laid great stress upon the judgment of this
court in CIT v. Dhadi Sahu [1993] 199 ITR 610. In this case, the assessee had
failed to disclose certain income falling to the share of his minor children for
the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70. The Income-tax Officer passed
assessment orders on February 28, 1970, and initiated penalty proceedings under
section 271(1)(c). Since the amounts of the penalty to be imposed would exceed
Rs. 1,000, the Income-tax Officer referred the cases under section 274(2), as it
then stood, to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Pending the penalty
proceedings, section 274(2) was amended with effect from April 1, 1971, as a
result of which only cases of penalty in which the income concealed was Rs.
25,000 or more were required to be referred to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner. In the assessee's case referred to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner, the income concealed was less than Rs. 25,000. Even so, the
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner passed orders on February 15, 1973, imposing
penalty in the sums of Rs. 24,000 and Rs. 12,500, respectively, for the
assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70. This court held that the reference had
been validly made by the Income-tax Officer to the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner before April 1, 1971, and the question was whether the amendment
that came into effect on April 1, 1971, divested the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner of his jurisdiction because the amount of concealed income did not
exceed Rs. 25,000 and the case did not fall within the ambit of section 274(2)
as amended. The amending Act, it was noted, did not make any provision that
references validly pending before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had to
be returned without passing any final orders, if the amount of income in respect
of which particulars had been concealed did not exceed Rs. 25,000. This
supported the inference that, in a pending reference, the Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner continued to have jurisdiction to impose penalty. The previous
operation of section 274(2) as it stood before April 1, 1971, and anything done
thereunder continued to have effect under section 6(b) of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, enabling the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to pass orders
imposing penalty in pending references. What was material was the date on which
the references were initiated. If the references had been made before April 1,
1971, they would be governed by section 274(2) as it stood before that date and
the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to pass the orders of
penalty.
Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the
Income-tax Officer had, in the instant case, satisfied himself that there had
been concealment of income on March 27, 1972, when he made the order of
assessment. Such satisfaction was a prerequisite to the initiation of the
penalty proceedings which were initiated on the same day. On that day, under the
amended provisions of section 274(2), the Income-tax Officer had the authority
to impose the penalty upon the assessee. Therefore, the High Court had answered
the reference correctly.
A penalty for concealment of particulars of income or for
furnishing inaccurate particulars of income can be imposed only when the
assessing authority is satisfied that there has been such concealment or
furnishing of inaccurate particulars. A penalty proceeding, therefore, can be
initiated only after an assessment order has been made which finds such
concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Who, at this point of time,
has the authority to impose the penalty is what is relevant. Whoever this
authority may be, he is obliged to impose such penalty as was permissible under
the law in that behalf on the date on which the offence of concealment of income
was committed, that is to say, on the date of the offending return. The two
aspects must firmly be borne in mind, namely, who may impose the penalty and in
what measure.
In the instant case, when the Income-tax Officer reached
the satisfaction that the assessee had concealed his income and made the
assessment order on March 27, 1972, the amended provisions of section 274 (2)
were in operation and they entitled the Income-tax Officer to impose penalty in
cases where the amount of income in respect of which particulars had been
concealed were, as here, less than Rs. 25,000.
We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court
answered the question referred to it correctly. The appeal, therefore, is
dismissed, with no order as to costs