[The judgment of Subba Rao, Mudholkar and Ramaswami JJ.
was delivered by Subba Rao J. The judgment of Raghubar Dayal and Bachawat JJ.
was delivered by Bachawat J.].
SUBBA RAO J.---This appeal by certificate raises the main
question whether section 2(6A)(d) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
hereinafter called the Act, is ultra vires the Central Legislature.
The assessee, a public limited company, was incorporated
on May 23, 1945, under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with a share capital of
Rs. 50 lakhs. On December 15, 1947, at the instance of the appellant the High
Court sanctioned the reduction of the capital of the company from Rs. 50 lakhs
to Rs. 25 lakhs. On August 6, 1954, the High Court sanctioned further reduction
of the share capital from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs. On November 4, 1954, the
Registrar of Companies granted the requisite certificate under section 61(4) of
the Indian Companies Act. On November 5, 1954, the appellant issued notices to
the shareholders inviting applications for the refund of share capital so
reduced. On the receipt of the applications, appropriate debit entries were made
in the accounts of the shareholders and the amounts were actually paid to them
during the previous year, i.e., December 1, 1954, to November 30, 1955. Under
section 2(6A)(d) of the Act, "dividend" includes any distribution by a
company on the reduction of its capital to the extent to which the company
possesses accumulated profits, whether such accumulated profits have been
capitalised or not. In assessing the income of the appellant-company for the
assessment year, 1956-57, the Income-tax Officer held that the said dividends
were distributed during the accounting year and on that finding he calculated
the rebate on super-tax in terms of clause (i)(b) of the second proviso to
paragraph D of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1956. If the
dividends were distributed during the accounting year, i.e., December 1, 1953,
to November 30, 1954, the appellant would be entitled to a higher rate of rebate
on super-tax under clause (ii) of the first proviso to paragraph D of Part II of
the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1956. The Income-tax Officer further held
that the assessee's accumulated profits at the time of the reduction of the
capital from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs were Rs. 8,42,337. On appeal, the
Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the said figure arrived at by the
Income-tax Officer. On further appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, for
the reasons recorded by it in its order, reduced the figure under the said head
by a sum of Rs. 3,61,405.
It was contended on behalf of the assessee that inasmuch
as the certificate from the Registrar for the reduction of the capital, from Rs.
25 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs was obtained on November 4, 1954, the distribution of
the dividends should be deemed to have taken place during the year 1953-54 and,
therefore, the said dividends were not exigible to tax for the assessment year.
The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal
concurrently rejected that plea and held that, as the actual payment to the
shareholders of the refund of the capital, and the debit in the accounts of the
shareholders were effected in the accounting year, the said dividends must be
held to have been distributed in the accounting year.
There is another sum of Rs. 11,687-3-0 received by the
appellant as security deposit on account of empty bottles. A question was raised
whether the said amount could be considered as capital gains and, therefore,
should be excluded from the accumulated profits. The Appellate Tribunal held in
favour of the assessee.
The assessee and the Commissioner of Income-tax filed two
applications before the Tribunal for referring questions of law arising out of
the Tribunal's order to the High Court. The Tribunal referred the following
questions of law to the High Court for its opinion :
" (1) Whether the provisions of section 2(6A)(d) of
the Indian Income-tax Act are ultra vires of the Central Legislature ?
(2) Whether the accumulated profits amounting to Rs.
4,60,244-I3-0 could be deemed to have been distributed on the reduction of the
capital from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs within the meaning of section 2(6A)(d)
of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
(3) Whether the amount of Rs. 11,687-3-0 received by the
assessee as security deposit on account of empty bottles could be considered as
capital gains ?
(4) Whether the accumulated profits could be considered as
dividend deemed to have been distributed in the assessment year 1955-56 in view
of the certificate granted by the Registrar of Companies under section 61(4) of
the Indian Companies Act, 1913, or could be considered as dividend deemed to
have been distributed in the assessment year 1956-57 because the debits of
refunds were actually made in the accounts of the shareholders during the
accounting period of the assessment year 1956-57 ?"
The High Court answered all the questions against the
assessee. Hence the appeal.
Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the assessee,
did not contest the correctness of the answer given by the High Court in regard
to the third question and, therefore, nothing further need be said about it.
The first question is whether section 2(6A)(d) of the Act
is ultravires the Central Legislature. Sub-section (6A) was inserted in section
2 of the Act by section 2 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 (VII of
1939). Section 2(6A)(d) of the Act reads :
" 'Dividend' includes any distribution by a company
on the reduction of its capital to the extent to which the company possesses
accumulated profits which arose after the end of the previous year ending next
before the 1st day of April, 1933, whether such accumulated profits have been
capitalised or not."
The said Act VII of 1939 was passed by the Central
Legislature in exercise of its powers conferred under section 100 of the
Government of India Act, 1935, read with entry 54 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule thereof. Entry 54 read : "Tax on income other than agricultural
income." Mr. Chatterjee contends that while the said entry 54 enables the
appropriate legislature to impose a tax on "income", the legislature,
by enlarging the definition of dividend so as to include the amount received, by
a shareholder towards the share capital contributed by him, which cannot
possibly be income, seeks to tax a capital receipt, and, therefore, the said
clause is ultra vires the Central Legislature.
Mr. R. Ganapathy Iyer, learned counsel for the revenue,
contends that a legislative entry must receive the widest connotation and should
not be interpreted in any narrow or restricted sense, and if so construed the
said entry enables the legislature to make a law to prevent evasion of tax on
income by devious methods and that the legislature in the instant case seeks to
prevent the growing evil of tax evasion by companies distributing profits under
the guise of reduction of capital.
It is a well settled rule of construction that entries in
the legislative lists cannot be read in a narrow or restricted sense : they
should be construed most liberally and in their widest amplitude. In the words
of Gwyer C.J. in United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, "each general word should
be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be said to be comprehended by it." This court in a number of
decisions held that the expression "income" in entry 54 of List I of
the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and the corresponding
entry 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, shall
be widely and liberally construed so as to enable a legislature to provide by
law for the prevention of evasion of income-tax. In Sardar Baldev Singh v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, this court maintained the constitutional validity of
section 23A(1) of the Income-tax Act, which empowered the Income-tax Officer to
impose super-tax in a case where a private limited company distributed less than
sixty per cent. of the total income of the company as dividends on the ground
that the object of the section was to prevent avoidance of super-tax by
shareholders of a company in which the public were not substantially interested.
In Balaji v. Income-tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle, this court ruled
that section 16(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Income-tax Act, which enabled the
Income-tax Officer in computing the total income of a person to include the
share of the income of his wife and minor sons therein, was constitutionally
valid for the reason that it was intended to prevent evasion of tax by persons
putting the properties in the names of their wives or minor children, as the
case may be. This court again in Navnitlal C. Javeri v. K. K. Sen, Appellate
Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, "D" Range, Bombay, sustained the
validity of section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which included
in the definition of "dividend", inter alia, payment made by the
company by way of advance or loan to a shareholder to the extent to which the
company possessed accumulated profits on the ground that it was a measure to
prevent private controlled companies adopting the device of making advances or
giving loans to their shareholders with the object of evading payment of tax.
The question in the instant case, therefore, is whether
the constitutional validity of section 2(6A)(d) of the Act can be supported on
the ground that it was enacted to prevent evasion of income-tax. While an entry
delineating a legislative field must be widely and liberally construed, there
must be a reasonable nexus between the item taxed and the field so delineated.
The said clause deals with the distribution by a company on the reduction of its
capital to the extent to which the company possesses accumulated profits.
Accumulated profits of a company may be utilised in the following 3 ways : (1)
for increasing the capital stock; (2) for distributing the same among the
shareholders by way of dividends ; and (3) for reducing the capital. Ordinarily,
a company reduces the capital when there is loss or depreciation of assets; in
that event there is no question of distribution of profits to the shareholders
but the shares are only devaluated. But a company may, on the pretext of
reducing its capital, utilise its accumulated profits to pay back to the
shareholders the whole or part of the paid up amounts on the shares. A
shareholder though in form gets back the whole or a part of the capital
contributed by him, in effect he gets a share of the accumulated profits which,
if a straightforward course was followed, he should have received as dividend.
This is a division of profits under the guise of division of capital; a
distribution of profits under the colour of reduction of capital. If this was
permitted, there would be evasion of super-tax, the extent of the evasion
depending upon the prevalence of the evil. The legislature, presumably in the
interest of the exchequer, enlarged the definition of "dividend" to
catch the said payments within the net of taxation. By doing so, it is really
taxing the profits in the hands of the shareholders, though they are receiving
the said profits under the cloak of capital.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that under the
Companies Act a company can lawfully reduce the share capital with the sanction
of the court, that there is no prohibition thereunder against such a reduction
being made by way of distribution of accumulated profits to the shareholders,
that the amounts so paid to them would be in law capital receipts and that,
therefore, there could not be in law or in fact any evasion of tax on income.
Reliance is placed upon sections 100 to 103 of the Companies Act. This argument
mixes up two aspects---the legal and fiscal. Under company law the question of
reducing capital is a domestic one for the decision of the majority of
shareholders. The court comes into the picture only to see that the reduction is
fair and equitable and that the interests of the minority and the creditors do
not suffer. It may not also be concerned with the motive of the general body in
resolving to reduce the capital; but the income-tax law is concerned with tax
evasion. Tax can be evaded by breaking the law, or avoided in terms of the law.
When there is a factual avoidance of tax, in terms of law, the legislature steps
in to amend the income-tax law so that it can catch such an income within the
net of taxation. There is, therefore, no inconsistency between a receipt being a
capital one under the company law, and by fiction being treated as taxable
income under the Income-tax Act.
Therefore, as section 2(6A)(d) of the Act embodies a law
to prevent evasion of tax, it falls within the ken of entry 54 of List I of
Schedule VII to the Government of India Act, 1935.
The next question is whether the said dividends were
distributed in the year 1953-54, as the appellant contends, or in the accounting
year 1954-55, as the respondent argues. The relevant sections of the Act in this
context are section 2(6A)(d) and section 16(2). Section 2(6A)(d) has been
already extracted. The relevant part of section 16(2) reads :
" For the purposes of inclusion in the total income
of an assessee any dividend shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in
which it is paid, credited or distributed ........"
"Dividend", with which we are now concerned, is
not that which we ordinarily understand by that expression, but dividend by
definition. Under section 2(6A)(d) of the Act it is one of the ingredients of
the definition that it shall have been distributed by a company on reduction of
the capital to the extent to which the company possesses accumulated profits.
Under section 16(2) of the Act such a dividend shall be deemed to be an income
of the previous year in which it is paid, credited or distributed. Unless such a
distribution as is mentioned in clause (d) of section 2(6A) of the Act had taken
place, it would not be a dividend. If it was not so distributed, section 16(2)
of the Act would not be attracted. To put it in other words, if the accumulated
profits were distributed, it would satisfy not only the definition of
"dividend" in clause (d) but also would fix the year in which it would
be deemed to be income. What then is the meaning of the expression
"distribution"? The dictionary meaning of the expression
"distribution" is "to give each a share, to give to several
persons". The expression "distribution" connotes something actual
and not notional. It can be physical; it can, also be constructive. One may
distribute amounts between different shareholders either by crediting the amount
due to each one of them in their respective accounts or by actually paying to
each one of them the amount due to him. This court had to construe the scope of
the word "paid" in section 16(2) of the Act in J. Dalmia v.
Commissioner of Income-tax. Shah J. speaking for the court, observed : "
The expression 'paid' in section 16(2), it is true, does not contemplate actual
receipt of the dividend by the member. In general, dividend may be said to be
paid within the meaning of section 16(2) when the company discharges its
liability and makes the amount of dividend unconditionally available to the
member entitled thereto."
This court again reaffirmed the said principle in Mrs. P.
R. Saraiya v. Commissioner of Income-tax, and held that where dividend was not
credited to any separate account of the assessee so that he could, if he wished,
draw it, it was not "credited or paid" within the meaning of section
16(2) of the Act. The same meaning must be given to the word
"distribution". The only difference between the expression
"paid" and the expression "distribution" is that the latter
necessarily involves the idea of division between several persons which is the
same as payment to several persons.
At this stage the anomaly that is alleged to flow from our
view may conveniently be noticed. It is said that there will be different points
of time for ascertaining the extent of the accumulated profits, with the result
section 2(6A)(d) of the Act becomes unworkable in practice or at any rate leads
to unnecessary complications. We do not see any justification for this comment.
Distribution is a culmination of a process. Firstly, there will be a resolution
by the general body of a company for reduction of capital by distribution of the
accumulated profits amongst the shareholders; secondly, the company will file an
application in the court for an order confirming the reduction of capital;
thirdly, after it is confirmed, it will be registered by the Registrar of joint
Stock Companies; fourthly, after the registration the company issues notices to
the shareholders inviting applications for refund of the share capital; and
fifthly, on receiving the applications the cornpany will distribute the said
profits either by crediting the proportionate share capital to each of the
shareholders in their respective accounts or by paying the said amounts in cash.
Out of the said 5 steps, the first 4 are only necessary preliminary steps which
entitle the company to distribute the accumulated profits. Credits or payments
are related to the said declaration : that is to say, distribution is from and
out of the accumulated profits resolved to be distributed by the company. In
this view, the accumulated profits to be distributed are fixed by the resolution
and the figure does not change with the date of payment or credit. Indeed, a
similar process is to be followed in the case of declaration of ordinary
dividends; firstly, there will be a resolution by the general body of the
company declaring the dividends; secondly, thereafter the amounts payable to
each of the shareholders are distributed by appropriate credits or payments.
Dividends may be paid or credited to different shareholders during different
accounting years; and the shareholders may be assessed in respect of the said
payments in different years. Even so, the payments are referable only to the
declaration of the dividends out of the profits of a particular year. This
court, as we have noticed earlier, in the decisions cited supra held that the
year of credit or payment to a shareholder was crucial for the purpose of
assessment and not the date of the declaration.
Let us see whether this view introduces any complication
in the matter of reduction of rebate on super-tax payable by the company. The
appellant-company set up a claim for a rebate on the super-tax under clause (ii)
of the first proviso to paragraph D of Part II of the first Schedule to the
Finance Act, I956. The company based its claim on the contention that the
distribution of dividends on reduction of capital took place during the year
ending November 30, 1954, and not during the year ending November 30, 1955, and,
therefore, clause (i)(b) of the second proviso to paragraph D of Part II of the
First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1956, read with Explanation (ii) to paragraph
D, which provides for reduction of rebate allowable under clause (ii) of the
first proviso; by an amount computed at certain slab rates on the amount of
dividends distributed to the shareholders during the e previous year, could not
be invoked. To put it in other words, the assessee claimed that as the dividends
were hot distributed in the accounting year, there could not be any reduction of
the rebates under clause (i)(b) of the said proviso. If, as we have held, the
distribution was made during the year ending November 30, 1955, i.e., the
accounting year when the amounts were paid, the revenue would be entitled to
reduce the rebate by the amount contoured at the prescribed rates on the amount
of dividends. Some complication may arise only if we accept the argument that
the date of payment fixes the date for ascertaining the quantum of accumulated
profits. But we have rejected that contention. In this view, the claim of
reduction of rebate on super-tax provided by the First Schedule to the Finance
Act, 1956, can be worked out without any confusion or complication. We,
therefore, hold that the dividends must be deemed to have been paid or
distributed in the year when it was actually, whether physically or
constructively, paid to the different shareholders, that is to say, when the
amount was credited to the separate accounts of the shareholders or paid to
them.
What are the facts in the present case ? The High Court,
on August 6, 1954, sanctioned the reduction of the capital from Rs. 25 lakhs to
Rs. 15 lakhs. On November 4, 1954, the Registrar of Companies issued the
certificate under section 61(4) of the Companies Act. On November 5, 1954, the
company issued notices to the shareholders inviting applications for refunds. In
the notice sent to the shareholders they were informed that the share transfer
register of the company would remain closed from November 16 to November 30,
1954 (both days inclusive), and refund would be made to those shareholders whose
names stood on November, 15, 1954, in the books of the company. After the
applications were received, the amounts payable to the shareholders were debited
in the accounts and refunds were actually granted during the accounting year
1955, i.e., between December 1, 1954, and November 30, 1955. It is clear from
the said facts that the amounts were distributed only during the accounting
year, when the amounts were both debited and paid. We, therefore, agree with the
High Court that the dividends were distributed to the shareholders during the
accounting year, i. e., 1954-55.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
BACHAWAT J.---For the reasons given by brother Subba Rao
J., we agree that section 2(6A)(d) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is not
ultra vires the Central Legislature, but we are unable to agree with his
conclusion With regard to the fourth question of law referred for the opinion of
the High Court. The fourth question arose because of the claim of the
appellant-company to a rebate of super-tax under clause (ii) of the first
proviso to paragraph D of Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act,
I956, and its contention that the distribution of dividends on reduction of
capital contemplated by section 2(6A)(d) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
took place during the year ending November 30, 1954, and not during the year
ending November 30, 1955, and consequently there could be no reduction of the
rebate under clause (i)(b) of the second proviso to paragraph D of Part II of
the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1956, read with Explanation (ii) to
paragraph D.
Now, clause (i)(b) of the second proviso to paragraph D of
Part II of the First Schedule to the Finance Act, 1956, provides for reduction
of the rebate allowable under clause (ii) of the preceding proviso by an amount
computed at certain slab rates on the amount of dividends "in the case of a
company referred to in clause (ii) of the preceding proviso which has
distributed to its shareholders during the previous year dividends in excess of
6 per cent. of its paid-up capital not being dividends payable at a fixed rate
", and the Explanation (ii) to paragraph D provides that for the purpose of
paragraph D
"the expression 'dividend' shall be deemed to include
any distribution included in the expression 'dividend' as defined in clause (6A)
of section 2 of the Indian Income-tax Act ". Section 2(6A)(d) of the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, provides that "dividend" includes "any
distribution by a company on the reduction of its capital to the extent to which
the company possesses accumulated profits which arose after the end of the
previous year ending next before the 1st day of April, 1933, whether such
accumulated profits have been capitalised or not. . ."
Obviously, section 2(6A)(d) contemplates a distribution on
reduction of capital under section 55(1)(c) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
under which subject to confirmation by the court, a limited company, if so
authorised by its articles, may by special resolution reduce the share capital
in any way, and in particular may "either with or without extinguishing or
reducing liability on any of its shares, pay off any paid-up capital which is in
excess of the wants of the company", and may, if and so far as is
necessary, alter its memorandum by reducing the amount of its share capital and
of its shares accordingly. Section 56 of the Act enables the company to apply to
the court for an order confirming the reduction, and under section 60 of the
Act, the court may make an order confirming the reduction on such terms and
conditions as it thinks fit. Upon compliance with certain formalities, the
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies is required under section 61 of the Act to
register the order and a minute approved by the court, and on such registration,
and not before, the resolution for reducing share capital as confirmed by the
order so registered shall take effect. Under section 62, the minute when
registered shall be deemed to be substituted for the corresponding part of the
memorandum of the company.
In the instant case, the issued, subscribed and paid-up
capital of the company was Rs. 25 lakhs, consisting of 5 lakhs shares of Rs. 5
each. On December 16, 1953, the company passed a special resolution for reducing
its share capital from Rs. 25 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs and for payment of Rs. 2 per
share to the existing shareholders under section 55(1) (c) of the Indian
Companies Act, 1913. On May 10, 1954, the company applied to the court for an
order confirming the reduction. On August 6, 1954, the High Court made an order
confirming the reduction. On November 4, 1954, the order and the minute approved
by the court were duly registered with the Registrar, and on the same date, the
Registrar issued a certificate of registration. On November 5, 1954, the notice
of registration was duly published. On the same day, the company issued a
circular notice to its shareholders stating that the refund of Rs. 2 per share
will be made on receiving confirmation of the registration and requesting the
shareholders to send their share certificates to the company at an early date
for necessary endorsement and refund of share capital and stating that the
refund would be made to the shareholders, whose names stood on November 15,
1954, in the books of the company, the share transfer register would remain
closed from November 16 to November 30, 1954, and the refunds would be made to
the shareholders whose names stood on November 15, 1954, in the books of the
company. The balance-sheet for the year ending November 30, 1954, did not show
the reduction, and the capital of the company in this balance-sheet was shown to
be Rs. 25 lakhs. The necessary book entries and the payments of dividends to the
shareholders were not made during the year ending November 30, 1954. The book
entries with regard to the reduction and refund were made, and the refunds were
given to the shareholders during the year ending November 30, 1955, and the
reduction was shown in the balance-sheet for the year ending November 30, 1955.
The point in issue is when does the distribution
contemplated by section 2(6A)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, take place?
Section 2(6A)(d) speaks of dividend in the shape of any distribution by a
company amongst its shareholders on reduction of its capital to the extent of
accumulated profits possessed by it. We reject the contention that this
distribution takes place when the dividend is paid or credited to the
shareholders. The distribution contemplated by section 2(6A)(d) is a
distribution by a, company " on the reduction of its capital ". The
word "on" has no fixed meaning, but in the context of the sub-section,
it must be given the meaning "at the time of", as
"on entering on the 1st of the month ". The
distribution contemplated by the sub-section is, therefore, distribution at the
time of the reduction of its capital, that is to say, when the resolution for
reduction of its capital under section 55(1)(c) of the Indian Companies Act,
1913, takes effect. As soon, as the resolution for reduction of capital and
consequential refund of the surplus capital to the shareholders takes effect,
the capital stands reduced, the surplus ceases to be capital and stands allotted
to the shareholders, each shareholder obtains a vested right to the refund of
his share of the surplus, and a liability arises on, the part of the company to
make the refund. This liability arises as soon as the reduction of capital takes
effect, and it matters not that the company has not made the necessary book
entries showing the reduction of capital and the transfer of the surplus to the
account of the shareholders. The word "distribution has several dictionary
meanings. In the context of section 2(6A)(d), it means allotment or
apportionment of the surplus amongst the shareholders; this allotment takes
place and each shareholder gets a vested right to his portion of the surplus as
soon as the capital stands reduced.
A close scrutiny of section 2(6A)(d) reveals that (a) the
distribution takes place on a single date and (b) the expression
"accumulated profits" means profits accumulated up to the date of the
distribution. These two basic ideas which are implicit in section 2(6A)(d) are
forcibly brought out, in the Explanation to the corresponding section 2(22) of
the Income-tax Act 1961. We thus find firstly that the entire distribution of
the surplus amongst the share-holders takes place on a single date. Now if the
distribution is to have certain single date, that date can only be the date when
the reduction of capital becomes effective. The payments to the shareholders
either actual or notional by credit entries in the books of account are made
subsequently. The payments need not be made on one date; they may be and often
are made on several dates. The successive payments cannot be the distribution
contemplated by section 2(6A)(d). We find, secondly that the accumulated profits
are to be ascertained on the date of the distribution. But we find
independently, for reasons mentioned hereafter, that the accumulated profits
must be ascertained on the date of the reduction of capital. Thus the two
events, namely, the distribution and the reduction of capital must synchronise,
and the accumulated profits must also be ascertained at the same point of time.
The synchronisation is also obvious on a plain reading of the abridged text
"any distribution on the reduction of capital to the extent of accumulated
profits."
The artificial dividend under section 2(6A)(d) must be
fixed by reference to the accumulated profits on the date of the reduction of
capital and not by reference to the accumulated profits on the successive dates
of the payments. If the amount of the dividend were to be fixed by reference to
the accumulated profits on the several dates of the payments, the result might
well be that some payments would be dividends to their full extent, some would
be dividends to a limited extent and some would not be dividends at all. Take a
case where the accounting year of the company ends on November 30, a resolution
for the reduction of its capital to the extent of rupees ten lakhs and for
refund of Rs. 2 for each share of Rs. 5 takes effect on June 30, 1954, and
payments of rupees one, six and three lakhs are made respectively on October 30,
1954, October 30, 1955, and October 30, 1956, and assume that the extent of the
accumulated profits is rupees ten lakhs, on June 30, 1954, and on October 30,
1954, rupees two lakhs on October 30, 1955, and rupees two lakhs on October 30,
1956. If the amount of the dividend were to be fixed by reference to the
accumulated profits on the dates of the payments, the result would be that the
payment of rupees one lakh would be dividend to the full extent, the payment of
rupees six lakhs would be dividend to the extent of one-third and the payment of
rupees three lakhs would not be dividend at all. It is reasonable to think that
the legislature did not contemplate such a result. The character of the
distribution is determined by the extent of the accumulated profits on the date
when the reduction of capital becomes effective and is not altered by any
subsequent increase of capital so distributed share alike the original character
of the distribution.
It is argued that in the case of a normal dividend, a
comparable distri bution takes place, a declaration of dividend out of the
profits of a particular year is made, and is followed by payment of the
dividend, and decided cases under section 16(2) show that the distribution takes
place on payment and not on the declaration of a dividend. We think this
comparison of the normal dividend with the artificial dividend in section
2(6A)(d) in the shape of the distribution to the extent of the accumulated
profits is misleading, and the assumptions on which this comparison is made are
not correct. The declaration of a normal dividend may be made out of accumulated
profits, and need not necessarily be made out of the profits of any particular
year. Section 2(6A)(d) does not contain any definition of a normal dividend. In
the case of a normal dividend, the question of ascertaining the accumulated
profits to the extent of which the distribution amounts to dividend does not
arise. This problem would have arisen, had section2(6A) defined normal dividend
as " any distribution by a company on the declaration of dividend to the
extent to which the company possesses accumulated profits ". On such a
definition the only possible interpretation would have been that the accumulated
profits are ascertained and the distribution takes place on the date of the
declaration of the dividend.
The argument based upon the decided cases under section
16(2) is misconceived. Section 16(2) dealt with the question when the dividend
shall be deemed to be the income of the shareholders. By section 16(2) the
dividend was deemed to be the income of the shareholders when it was paid,
credited or distributed. An artificial dividend under section 2(6A)(d) is either
distributed or paid, whereas the normal dividend is either paid or credited, and
in the case of T. Dalmia v. Commissioner of Income-tax and Padmavati R. Saraiya
v. Commissioner of Income-tax, it was held that the normal dividend is neither
paid nor credited by reason of the fact that the dividend is declared. In this
case, we are not concerned with the problem of construction of section 16(2) or
the interpretation of the word "paid" or " credited ". The
word " distributed" is not synonymous with the word "paid"
or "credited". The three words are used in the Act in different
senses. Moreover, the policy of the legislature on the question of the
taxability of the dividend in the hands of the shareholders has varied from time
to time. Sub-section (2) of section 16 was repealed and in its place,
Sub-section (1A) of section 12 was introduced by the Finance Act, 1959, with
effect from April 1, 1960, and the corresponding provision is to be found in
section 8 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Under section 12(1A) of the Income-tax
Act, 1922, and-section 8 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the declaration of
dividend is crucial even for the purposes of assessment of the shareholders. The
legislature thus recognises now that the distribution of the normal dividend
takes place on the declaration of the dividend.
In the instant case, the resolution for the reduction of
the capital of the company and the consequential refund of the surplus capital
to its shareholders took effect on November 4, 1954. Consequently, the
distribution of the dividend as defined by section 2(6A)(d) took place on
November 4, 1954, i.e., during the previous year corresponding to the assessment
year 1955-56. It is true that during the accounting year ending November 30,
1954, the company did not pay any dividends, nor make any book entries with
regard to reduction of capital or with regard to refund or payment of surplus
capital. But the company incurred on November 4, 1954, the legal liability to
make the refunds and the distribution must be deemed to have taken place on
November 4, 1954, though no book entries were made and no payments were made on
that date. In view of the fact that the distribution took effect on November 4,
1954, the company was bound to make necessary entries in their books on November
4, 1954, showing the reduction of capital, and was also bound to show the
reduction in its balance-sheet for the year ending November 30, 1954.
Irrespective of its method of book-keeping, the company incurred on November 4,
1954, the legal liability to make the refunds. The method of book-keeping is not
relevant, but, were it so, it is pertinent to remember that the accounts of the
company were kept on the mercantile basis. That system of accounting brings into
debit as expenditure the amount for which a legal liability has been incurred
before it is actually disbursed : see Keshav Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax.
In conclusion, we must point out that the revenue
authorities should have, but in fact have not fixed the amount of the dividend
by reference to the accumulated profits on November 4, 1954, when the resolution
for reduction of capital became effective, or by reference to the accumulated
profits brought forward on December 1, 1953, at the commencement of the
accounting year during which the reduction of capital took effect. Instead, the
revenue authorities took into account the accumulated profits on December 1,
1954, that is to say, the date of the commencement of the subsequent accounting
year, during which the dividends were paid. The amount of the accumulated profit
as on December 1, 1954, was fixed by the Income-tax Officer at Rs. 8,42,337 and
was subsequently reduced by the Tribunal to Rs. 4,69,244-13-0. The revenue
authorities rightly assumed that the distribution and the ascertainment of the
accumulated profits to the extent of which the distribution is deemed to be
dividend under section 2(6A)(d) took place during the same accounting year, but
they erred in holding that the accounting year commencing on December 1, 1954,
is the relevant year.
In our opinion, the High Court was in error in holding
that dividends under section 2(6A)(d) were distributed during the previous year
corresponding to the assessment year 1956-57. We think that the dividends, if
any, under section 2(6A)(d) were distributed in the previous year corresponding
to the assessment year 1955-56, and the fourth question should be answered
accordingly. The appeal is allowed in part to this extent. In view of the
divided success, we direct that the parties will pay and bear their own costs in
this court and in the court below.
ORDER.---In accordance with the majority judgment, the
appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.