The judgment of the court was delivered by
ALAGIRISWAMI J.--The question that arises for decision in
these appeals is whether a Hindu deity is an " individual " within the
meaning of that word under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It
arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in a number of
references under section 66(1) of the Act. The facts necessary for the decision,
in a short compass, are these: In the year 1820 one Smt. Chitra Dassi executed
an ekrarnama making a gift of a piece of land for religious purposes. In 1842
she executed a will referring to the fact that she had earlier made the property
debutter and directed her four sons, the executors, to perform the daily service
of Sri Radhagobindjee. She died in 1855. In 1876 a suit was filed in the
Calcutta High Court praying that the trust should be administered by the court
and a scheme prepared. Subsequently, there were a number of applications made
from time to time and a number of orders were also made on them. In 1929 a
scheme of administration was framed and a little later the official trustee of
Bengal was appointed to be the trustee of the said debutter estate. After the
official trustee took possession of the properties he was assessed in respect of
the income of the debutter estate in the status of an " individual "
under section 41 of the Act. In respect of the assessment years 1939-40 to
1942-43 a reference was made under section 66(2) of the Act. A Bench of the
Calcutta High Court held that upon a proper construction of the relevant
documents and the scheme sanctioned and orders passed by the High Court the
property should be held to be a religious trust. The matter again went up to the
High Court in respect of the assessment years 1943-44 to 1951-52. Three
questions finally came to be considered by the High Court:
" (1) Whether upon a proper construction of the
relevant documents executed by Smt. Chitra Dassi and the relevant schemes
sanctioned and orders passed by the High Court, there was a trust in favour of
the Deity or whether there was a dedication of the properties to the deity ?
(2) Alternatively, if the dedication to the Thakur
constitute trust, is it a religious trust which did not enure to the benefit of
the public ?
(3) Is the Thakur Radha Gobinda Jew liable to assessment
under the Indian Income-tax Act? "
On question No. 1 the High Court held that upon a proper
construction of the relevant documents executed by Chitra Dassi and the relevant
schemes sanctioned and orders passed by the High Court there was a dedication of
the properties to the deity, but that there was no trust in the technical sense,
that is to say, as understood in the English law. In respect of the first part
of the second question both parties before the High Court agreed that in that
question the word " trust " did not mean a trust in the technical or
the English sense. The High Court pointed out that it has been held that a
dedication is a trust in the general sense within the meaning of t he expression
as used in sections 4, 40 and 41 of the Income-tax Act and the word " trust
" can be applied to Hindu endowments. On the second, part of the question
it was held that the endowment is a private religious trust and the documents
creating it or confirming it grant no benefit to the members of the public, that
an order made by the Calcutta High Court by which certain directions were given
for feeding the poor, were the only instance in which a benefit enured to the
public. As regards the third question the High Court elaborately discussed
whether the deity could be held to be an " individual " and held that
the deity was liable to assessment under the Income-tax Act.
Before this court the only point argued was whether the
High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the deity is an "
individual ". When the High Court dealt with this question it did not have
the benefit of the decision of this court in Jogendra Nath Naskar v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, wherein it was held that a Hindu deity falls within
the meaning of the word " individual " in section 3 and can be treated
as a unit of assessment. Mr. Chatterjee arguing for the appellant urged that
that decision was wrong and should be reconsidered. We find ourselves in entire
agreement with the decision of this court referred to above. We shall, however,
state our reasons within a short compass.
It was conceded before us on behalf of the appellant that
if the word used had been a " person " instead of an " individual
" the deity would be a person because a person will include a juristic
person. That a Hindu deity is a juristic person is a well-established
proposition and has been so for a long time. In Maharjee Shibessouree Debia v.
Mothoorantalli Achario it was observed:
" The talook itself, with which these jummas were
connected by tenure, was dedicated to the religious services of the idol. The
rents constituted, therefore, in legal contemplation, its property. The sebait
had not the legal property, but only the title of manager of a religious
endowment.
In Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo , the above
observations were cited with approval. In Manobar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram
Govinndram, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed:
" The Hindu law, like the Roman law and those derived
from it, recognises, not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in
the corporation apart from its individual members, but also the juridical
persons or subjects called foundations ....... It is consistent with the grants
having been made to the juridical person symbolized or personified in the idol .
The Madras High Court in Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v.
Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami, expressed the view :
" It is to give due effect to such a sentiment,
widespread and deeprooted as it has always been, with reference to something pot
capable of holding property as a natural person, that the laws of most countries
have sanctioned the creation of a fictitious person in the matter, as is implied
in the felicitous observation made in the work already cited : Perhaps the
oldest of all juristic persons is the God, hero or the saint '. "
In Pramatha Nath mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, the
Privy Council observed:
" A Hindu idol is, according to long established
authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition
thereof by courts of law, a ' juristic entity '. It has a juridical status with
the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person
who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the
powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager
of the estate of an infant heir. It is unnecessary to quote the authorities; for
this doctrine, thus simply stated, is firmly established."
The authorities thus amply establish that a Hindu deity is
a juristic person capable of holding property.
Reference was made to the decision in Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Ahmedabad Mill Owners' Association where Beaumont C.J. held:
" ' Individual ', where first used, must mean human
being, because it is used as something distinct from a joint family, firm and
company. The whole expression seems to me to mean ' every human being, Hindu
undivided family, company, firm and other association of human beings."
Though in consequence of this decision the Income-tax
(Amendment) Act, 1939, amended the words de association of individuals "
into " association of persons ", the word " individual ",
being first of the six assessable units. mentioned in section 3, was retained
and was not amended into " person ". It could not be changed into
" person " for the obvious reason that the word " person "
is of wider import and includes any company or association or body of
individuals, whether incorporated or not. So a word had to be chosen, which
would not carry with it the wider import of the words " person " and
the word " individual appears to have been chosen. In Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Sodra Devi it was pointed out that the word " individual
" not only means a human being but also includes a corporation created by a
statute, e.g., an University or a Bar Council ror the trustees of a baronetcy
trust, incorporated by a Baronetcy Act. (Ste the decisions in Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Salem District Urban Bank Ltd., Commissioner of Income-tax v. Bar
Council and Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim Baronetcy Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax
). But Dass J. observed :
" ........... there is no difficulty whatsoever, in
my opinion, in giving the word ' individual ' its natural meaning, that is, that
the word means either a male or a female."
But the court in that case was not concerned with the
problem whether the word " individual " can refer to a juridical
entity. Mukharji J. of the Calcutta High court in mmissioner of Income-tax v.
Jogendra Nath Naskar held that a Hindu deity can be either an individual or a
person or both. The same High Court in Sri Sridhar v. Income-tax Officer held
that a Hindu idol is a juristic entity who is given the status of a human being
capable of having property and it can be called an " individual ".
We are of opinion that as a Hindu deity can hold property
and be in receipt of income and can also sue and be sued in a court of law there
is no reason why its income should be held to be outside the ambit of taxation
if it can be brought within it without straining the language of the statutory
provision. It would naturally be taxed through its shebaits who are in
possession and management of its property. We may, however, mention that the
problem whether the Hindu deity is an individual is not likely to arise after
the enactment of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which in clause (31) of section 2
defines a " person " as including: (i) an individual, (ii) a Hindu
undivided family, (iii) a company, (iv) a firm, (v) an association of persons or
a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, (vi) a local authority, and
(vii) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding
sub-clauses.
The appeals are dismissed with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
