[The judgment of GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J., WANCHOO and RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ. was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J. DAS GUPTA J. delivered the judgment of SARKAR and DAS GUPTA JJ.]

GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J.---The short question of law which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act), can be said to be a proceeding in any court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This question arises in this way. The appellant, Lalji Haridas, and respondent No. 2, Mulji Manilal Kamdar, are businessmen and they carry on their business in Jamnagar and Bombay respectively. They have known each other for several years past in the course of their ordinary business activities. In the income-tax assessment proceedings of the appellant for the assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51, respondent No. 2 gave evidence on oath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar, on December 4, 1958. In his evidence he denied that he had a son named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business in the name of M/s. Nihal Chand and Co. at Jamnagar. According to the appellant, the said statements were false to the knowledge of respondent No. 2 and were made by him to mislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of income-tax on himself. As a result of the said false statements, the appellant was heavily taxed.

On November 24, 1959, the appellant filed a criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (No. 452/S of 1959) in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. At the hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings in which he was alleged to have made a false statement on oath were proceedings before a court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and since no complaint in writing had been made by the court of the Income-tax Officer before which the said proceedings were conducted, the provisions of section 195(1)(b) created a bar against the competence of the appellant's complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not a court within the meaning of section 19(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and so, he rejected the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2.

Against the said decision of the Presidency Magistrate, respondent No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision Application (No. 1142 of 1960 ) before the Bombay High Court. The State of Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said revision application. A Division Bench of the said High Court reversed the conclusion of the Presidency Magistrate ; and held that the Income-tax Officer was a court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and so it upheld the preliminary objection raised by respondent No. 2. In the result, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered to be dismissed. The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the Bombay High Court under article 134 (1)(c) of the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that he has brought the present appeal before us. That is how the narrow question which arises for our decision in the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer are proceedings in any court under section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question thus raised is undoubtedly a short one, but its decision is not easy, because the arguments urged in support of the two respective constructions are fairly balanced and the task of preferring one construction to the other presents some difficulty.

The proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during which, according to the appellant, respondent No. 2 made a false statement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under section 37 of the Act. Section 37(1) deals with the powers of income-tax authorities and provides, inter alia, that the Income-tax Officer shall, for the purposes of the Act, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the matters specified by clauses (a) to (d). Section 37(2) confers upon the Income-tax Officer certain additional powers which can be exercised subject to any rules made in that behalf, provided the said officer is specially authorised by the Commissioner in that behalf, and in exercising these powers, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, relating to searches apply. Section 37(3) deals with the question of impounding and retaining any books of account or other documents. That takes us to section 37(4) which is relevant for our purpose ; this section provides that any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. It is thus clear that while the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under section 37(1), (2) and (3) the proceedings held by him are judicial proceedings for the purposes of the three sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in sub-section (4). Therefore, the question as to whether the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent No. 2 was made by him at any stage of a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code must be answered in the affirmative. That is the plain effect of section 37(4) of the Act.

Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code with which we are directly concerned in the present appeal provides for punishment for intentionally giving false evidence. It consists of two parts : the first part deals, inter alia, with false evidence intentionally given in any stage of a judicial proceeding, and prescribes that the person found guilty of having given such false evidence in a judicial proceeding shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine ; the second part deals with cases where false evidence has been intentionally given in any other case, and it, prescribes the maximum sentence of three years as well as fine. In other words, if the false evidence has been intentionally given in any judicial proceeding, the sentence awardable is higher than that where false evidence is intentionally given in proceedings which are not judicial. There are three explanations to section 193. Explanation 1 provides that a trial before a court-martial is a judicial proceeding ; explanation 2 lays down that an investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a court of justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a court of justice ; this explanation takes in, for instance, committal proceedings. Under explanation 3, an investigation directed by a court of justice according to law, and conducted under the authority of a court of justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a court of justice. This explanation covers enquiries before officers deputed by courts of justice to ascertain, for instance, on the spot the boundaries of land. It would thus be seen that having provided for a higher sentence in regard to the offence of giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, the three explanations of section 193 include within the expression " judicial proceeding " certain proceedings which on a strict construction of the said expression may not have been included under it. For the purpose of the present appeal, however, the only point to notice at this stage is that section 37(4) of the Act makes a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer, held under the said section, a judicial proceeding for the purposes of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and that means that if an offence of giving false evidence is proved to have been committed by a person in a proceeding before the Income-tax Officer, he would be liable for the higher sentence awardable under the first part of section 193.

That takes us to section I95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is well-known that section 195 provides for an exception to the ordinary rule that any person, can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 4(h) of this Code defines a " complaint " as meaning the allegation made orally or in writing to a magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include the report of a police officer. This definition shows that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence. Section 190 requires that the magistrate to whom a complaint has been made should take cognizance of the said complaint, subject to the provisions of the said section. Thus, the general rule is that any person can make a complaint, and section 195 provides for an exception. Section 195(1)(b) with which we are concerned, provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the sections therein mentioned, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such court is subordinate ; amongst the sections mentioned are sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The effect of this provision is that if an offence is alleged to have been committed either under section 193 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and it appears that the said offence was committed in relation to any proceeding in any court, it is only if the said court, or the court to which it is subordinate, makes a complaint in that behalf that cognizance will be taken of the said complaint. A person cannot make a complaint in respect of the alleged commission of any of the offences specified in section 195(1)(b) ; that is its plain effect.

Section 195(2) which was added in 1923 when the earlier section 105 was substantially amended, provides that in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term " court " includes a civil, revenue or criminal court, but it does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. It is necessary to deal with the effect of this provision, because, as will presently appear, we do not propose to base our decision on the ground that the Income-tax Officer is a revenue court under this sub-section. The only point of interest to which we may incidentally refer is that this sub-section gives an inclusive, though not an exhaustive, definition and takes within its purview not only civil and criminal courts, but also revenue courts, while excluding a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act.

In dealing with the question which has been raised in the present appeal what we are required to determine is whether a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer which by virtue of the operation of section 37(4) of the Act, must be held to be a judicial proceeding under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, is a proceeding in any court under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 193 makes a distinction between offences committed in any judicial proceeding and those committed in proceedings other than judicial proceeding, whereas section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not refer to judicial proceedings as such, but mentions proceedings in any court. That is why the controversy between the parties in the present appeal lies within a very narrow compass. Can it be said that the proceeding which is a judicial proceeding under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code must be held to be a proceeding in any court under section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is on this aspect of the dispute that the arguments on both sides are fairly balanced.

In dealing with this question, it is unnecessary to consider what would have been the position of the Income-tax Officer acting under section 37(1), (2) and (3), and what would have been the character of the proceedings taken before him if sub-section (4) had not been enacted. In Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh it has been held by this court that the Sales-tax Officer functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (15 of 1948), was not a court within the meaning of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and so, it was not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of any person against whom it was alleged that he had committed an offence under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. This decision would tend to indicate that in the absence of section 37(4) it would have become necessary to hold that the Income-tax Officer acting under section 37(1), (2) and (3), would not be a court under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in that sense the provisions of section 195 could not have been attracted. This position is not disputed by Mr. Desai who appears for respondent. No. 2.

He, however, contends that the provisions of section 37(4) which have been inserted in the Act in 1956 make all the difference, and according to him, this sub-section was added in order to make section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer. On the other hand, the Additional Solicitor-General has strenuously argued that the purpose which the legislature had in mind in inserting sub-section (4) in section 37 was merely to make the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and not to make section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to them. If the intention of the legislature had been to take the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer within the mischief of the said section of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature would have expressly said so in terms. The omission to refer to the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure in section 37(4) is not accidental, but deliberate, and so, though the proceeding before the Income-tax Officer may be and has to be regarded as a judicial proceeding under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it cannot be said to be a proceeding before a court, because the Income-tax Officer is not a court.

In support of his argument, the Additional Solicitor-General has referred us to several statutes where the legislative intention to extend the provisions of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to specific proceedings has been carried out by making an express provision in that behalf. Section 23 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), provides that the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a civil court for the purposes therein indicated, and by an amendment made in 1929, it further lays down that the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument is that where the legislature wanted to extend the provisions of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to the proceedings before the Commissioner held under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it thought it necessary to make a specific and express provision in that behalf. A similar provision is contained in section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936). In the Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (14 of 1947), the position is similar to that in the case of the Workmen's Compensation Act ; section 11(4) confers on the authorities therein specified powers as are vested in a civil court in respect of the matter mentioned therein. In 1950, sub-section (8) was added to section 11 by which it was provided that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This scheme also shows, says the Additional Solicitor-General, that where the legislature wants to make any Tribunal or authority a court, it uses express and appropriate language in that behalf. Section 45 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (31 of 1950), likewise confers powers of a civil court on the Custodian and expressly adds that the proceedings before him shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and the Custodian shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same provision is made by section 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 (64 of 1951), as well as by section 26 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44 of 1954).

On the other hand, section 51 of the Administrator-General's Act 1913 (3 of 1913), provides that whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes a false statement on oath knowingly, he shall be deemed to have intentionally given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding. The argument is that, in this case, the legislature wanted to equate the proceedings under this Act with judicial proceedings under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and did not intend to make section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to them, because it does not make the authority under this Act a court, or does not, in terms, extend the provisions of the said section to the proceedings held before such an authority. The same comment has been made on the provisions of section 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (8 of 1878). Thus presented, the argument is no doubt attractive and cannot be rejected as without any substance.

The expression " judicial proceeding " is not defined in the Indian Penal Code, but we have the definition of the said expression under section 4(m) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 4(m) provides that " judicial proceeding "